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Unemployment insurance is a policy instrument designed to
help alleviate the costs to individuals oflosing theirjobs for
reasons beyond theircontrol. It does morethan that,however.
Economictheoryand empirical evidencedemonstrate that the
presence ofunemployment insurance and the type of system
adopted can have important effects on many aspects of the
labormarket allocation process, including wages, hours per
worker, firm size, and both the frequency and the duration of
unemployment. This leads naturally to debate over how to
design an efficient unemployment insurance system. I intend
to focus on one key question in this debate: How does un-
employment insurance affect the decision by employers to
utilize eithertemporary layoffs or work-sharing? The answer
depends on the way in which unemployment insurance
benefits are paid and the way in which taxes are levied to
finance these benefits. -
In particular, Iconsider two altemativesystems for paying
unemployment insurance benefits. In one system, workers
receive benefits if laid off but nothing if their hours are cut
back while they remain employed. In the other system,
workers amnot only paidbenefits if laid offbutare also paid
a prorated fraction of these benefits, referred to as short-time
compensation, if they remain employed but have their hours
reduced. These two systems are not merely theoretical ab-
stractions, but correspond to the way in which benefits are
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actually paid in different countries. In the United States and
in Canada, at least until recently, workers have had to be
unemployed to collect unemployment benefits, while short-
tune compensation has been used for some time in many
European countries, including Austria, Belgium, Deumark,
France, Germany, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Nor-
way, Sweden, and the United Kingdom (Best and Mateesich
1980,MaCoy and Morand 1984).t
It may beargued that the North Americansystem,without
short-time compensation, providesan incentive for the use of
layoffs ratherthan work-sharing during economicdownturns.
Underthe European system,which has short-timecompensa-
tion, wheneconomic conditions deteriorate, instead oflaying
off 20 percent of its work force, for example, the firm could
reduce its workweek from five to four days and have its
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In practice,in Germany, for example, at leasta third ofa fum’s workers mnst
experience an leasta 10 percent reduction in hours for at leastfour weeks in orderfor
any of them to receive compensation, and workers in oceupallons with irregular
employment are excluded. Thenormalmaximum durationofshort-thnecompensation
payments in Germany is six months, but these payments sometimesextend forup to
twoyears. Thetypical experience isacutback in hours ofabout 40 pereent, for nomore
than threemonths (Beat and Maltesich 1980, Meisel 1984).employees draw partial benefits (20percent oftheir full-time
equivalent)on thefifth day.2Somepolicy discussions suggest
that theresulting work-sharing would bepreferable tolayoffs.
For example, Reid(1985, p. 151) says that “although [short-
timecompensation]merely redistributes employment, [unem-
ployment insurance] benefits and leisure, it is both more
efficient andmoreequitable than the alternative offulllayoffs
forsome workers.” Basedon thisline ofargnment,short-time
compensation has been introduced into the Canadian system
and several U.S. state systems during the past decade. (See
Watford 1986 for a discussion of how federal policymakers
haveencouraged the adoption ofshort-time compensation by
U.S. state systems.)
My purpose in this paper is twofold.First, I want toshow
that the useofshort-time compensation does encourage firms
to rely less heavily on layoffs and more heavily on work-
sharing. Second, I want to show that both the European
systemwithshort-time compensationandtheNorthAmerican
system withoutshort-time compensation will tendtopromote
inefficiencies in the labor market uniess the revenue side of
the system is properly administered. The keyparameter is the
extent to which unemployment insurance taxes are experi-
ence-rated, where experience-rating refers to the practice of
basinga fu-m’s unemployment insurancetax billon itsactual
layoffor hours-reduction practices. Asystem with short-time
compensation does not encourage unemployment, which in
this context means temporary layoffs, the way a system
without it does. However, if taxes are less than completely
experience-rated, then the system withshort-time compensa-
tion encourages nndereml3loynnent, which in this context
means an inefficiently low level of hours per employed
worker.
The main policy message that comes outof the theoretical
analysis is that the useofshort-time compensation willindeed
encourage work-sharing, but that both systems canbe made
more efficient by adjusting experience-rating. To help
convince the reader that the basic model underlying this
message is empirically relevant, Ialso presentsome evidence
supporting its fundamental prediction: In economies with
short-time compensation, the number of hours per worker
should varymoreand thenumber ofworkers shouldvary less
in response to fluctuations in economic conditions. To this
end, I compare the United States and Canada with several
European countries in terms of relative variability in the
number of employed workers and hours per employed
worker. Consistentwith the model’s implications,the data for
those countries withshort-time compensation tend to display
less variability in the number of employed workers and
greater variability inthe numberof hoursper worker than do
the data for countries without short-time compensation.3
The Model
Theframeworkemployedhere is basedon thestandard labor-
contracting model of Azariadis (1975). Unemployment
insurance is parameterized as has become standard in the
literature since the work ofFeldstein (1976) and Burdett and
Hool (1983), but here I also consider short-time compensa-
tion. The model is a version of the one used in Burdett and
Wright 1989b,simplified to illustrate the essential points in a
straightforward manner.
There is arepresentative firm withthe production function
q as f(I,x), where q is output, 1 is labor input, and x is a
random variable representing technological or other uncer-
tainty affecting the relationship between I and q. (Capital is
assumed fixed here and is subsumed in the notation.) I
assume there am N possible values for x and let
prob(.~~), for] as 1, 2 N. I make the usual assumptions
on the production function, that the marginal product is
positivebut decreasing andthat highervalues ofxindex both
a highertotal and a highermarginalproduct oflabor. Mathe-
matically, these assumptions correspond tof
t > 0,f1 <0,
> 0,andf~2 >0, where subscripts denote partialderivatives.
I also adopt the standard specification that the labor input is
given by I as nh, where n denotes the number of workers
employed and h denotes the number ofhours per employed
worker.
4
The farm is owned by a single individual, called the
employct; who is interested inmaximizing expectedprofit. A
large number of homogeneous workers are attached to the
2Therehas always been some use ofpartialbenefits inmost U.S. statevystems.but
suchbenefits have boon roughtylimited tothe difference between fult unemployment
insurance and employed earnings. Forexample, a workerregularly earning$500 for a
five-day weekwho is eligible for $200 ofunemployment insurancein case ofa layoff
would receive no benefits for a four-day weekpaying$400 since this income already
exceeds the$200 benefit. Under short-time compensation, a workercutback to a four-
day week would becompensated by 20 pereent ofthe $200. for atotal income of$440.
ft should be noted that in this paper I am only considering one aspect of
unemployment insurance—its effecton the fum’s decision toeither reduce hoursor lay
off workers. I ignore the effect ofunemployment insurance on the durationofsearch
unemployment (Mortensen 1986). Anotherimportant simplification is that I take firm
size asgiven; ifthis were made endogenous, the presence ofunemployment insurance
would influence notonly decisions to lay off workers butalso decisions to hire them
in the first place. Hence, unemployment insurance can change the size offirmsor the
relativesizes ofstable and risky firms (Burdenand ‘Wright t§89a, Gaston and ‘Wright
199 t). A readable discussion of the impact ofanemployment insurance in a broad
context, asopposed to the narrower focus adopted here, canbe found in Hamermesh
1977.
4In Burdert and ‘Wright 1989b, the more general specification I = 1(n.h) is also
considered; most ofthe interesting results canbe derivedin the special (but standard)
case considered here. Economically,I = nh means thus reducing the number ofworkers
by 10 percent has the Caine effect on output us reducing hours per worker by 10
percent. The implicationin the present context is that, in the absence ofunemployment
insurance. both the firm and itsworkers prefer work-sharing tolayoffs; hence, there will
be nounemployment. More generalspecificationo cangive riseto unemployment in the
model without unemployment insurance, butthe use ofI = nh allows me toisolate tie
effectsofpolicy exclusively.
12firm for the duration of the period under consideration. I
normalize the total number of workers to unity so that I can
speak interchangeably of the number and the proportion of
workers whoare either employedor laid off. Each employed
worker provides labor up to the maximum amount of time
available in the period, which I also normalize to unity; that
is, each worker has one unit of time todivide between labor,
h, and leisure, I — h. Workers also have common preferences
described by a utility function defined over income and
leisure, n(y, I—h), that isstrictly increasing andstrictly concave.5
Governmentpolicy is parameterizedas follows.Recallthat
h is the hours worked per person. Let G = G(h) be the
government unemployment insurance benefits received by a
given worker. Underthe North American system, G = 0 if It
> 0 and C = g if h = 0, for some constant g. Under the
European system,C = g(l—h/H) if h <Hand G = 0i fIt
where II is meant to represent some notion of normal hours.
To avoid deciding what constitutes normal hours here, I
simply set flas I. Althoughthese representationsareobvious-
ly highly stylized versions of any actual benefit scheme in
North America or in Europe, they neatly capture the two
extremes of no compensation and full compensation for
reductions in hours.
Asinmuchoftheunemployment insurance literaturesince
Feldstein 1976, I assume that taxes arepaid by the employer
accordingto the schedule ~as T+eG, where Tis a lump-sum
tax, G is totalbenefits paidto theaverage worker whostarted
the period withthe firm, ande is theexperience-rating factor.
If e as 1, the firm’s taxes increase dollar-for-dollar with the
benefitsdrawn by itsemployees orformer employees, andthe
firm is said to be completely experience-rated. If e < I, the
firm is said to be incompletely experience-rated, and it gets
unemployment insurance for its workers at an actuarially
favorable rate. Although actual unemployment insurance tax
policy is somewhat complicated in the United States, effec-
tively e< I formany employers (Becker 1972, Topel 1983).
In all other countries, e = 0.
A laborcontract will be represented by an employment-
compensation package that depends on thestate—that is, on
therealization of the random variable x. Therefore,a contract
is given by four functions, [n(x),h(x),w(x),b(x)], where n(x) is
the proportion of workers employed, h(x) is the number of
hours per employed worker, w(x) is the wage rate, and b(x)
is apayment made tolaid-offworkers by their employer. One
should think ofb(x) as asupplementary (private) unemploy-
ment benefit, orseverance payment, that each laid-offworker
receives in addition to public unemployment insurance. All
workers are offered the same contract, since they are identi-
cal. However, when some proportion of the workers are not
employed—that is, when n(x) < I—I say that some of them
are on (cnlporaiy (ayoff. since n(x) is the proportion of
workers that am employed (that is, not laid oIl), itis also the
probability that any one ofthem is employed.
Hence, theexpectedutilityofarepresentative employee in
statex can be written as
(I) U~x~ = n~x)uLVe~x), 1 — h~x)] + [1 — ~ I]
where y~~x) denotesincome while employedand v
1~(x) denotes
income while unemployed. Income depends on government
policy. Under the North American system, Ye(X) as w(h)lt(x),
and under the European system, ypf) nt’(x)h(x) +
g[ I — h(x)]. Under either system, y~(x) = b(x) + g. The
employer’s after-tax profit in state xcan be written as
(2) lt(x) asf[l( t) v] — n(x)h(x)w(x) — [I — n(x)]b(x) — t(x)
where, again, 1(x) is theemployer’s totaltax bill.This taxhill,
of course, also depends on government policy. Under the
North Americansystem, t(x) as T+ eg[ I — ve(x)j, while under
the European system, t(x) as T + eg[ 1 — n(x)lt(x)], after
simplification.
Ex~ected utility is EU as >L~ 6~U(~), and expected profit is
E1as
2~O~t(xj). An efficient contract is defined as a solution
to the following problem:
(3) maximize Eir subject to EU= U
and also subject to the constraint ,t(x) =I for all x. (For
simplicity, I ignore all nonnegativity constraints.) Hence, an
efficient contract yields the maximumexpected profit for the
employergiven that workers mustbe guaranteedan expected
utility of at least U in order for them to accept the contract.
As the parameter Li is varied, solutions to problem (3)
generate the set of efficient contracts parameterized by how
big a sham of the pie gnes to workers; but nothing depends
on Uforourpurposes. That is, the model makes predictions
aboutthe efficiencypropertiesofcontracts, andtheseefficien-
cy properties are independent of equity considerations.6
5Theassumption that workers’utility functionis striedyconcave meansthatthey
are striedy risk averse,in the sense thatotherthings being equal they preferthe certain
prospectofr units ofincome and I — It units ofleisure to a random prospectwhich
yieldsv and I — h on average. By contrast,the employer is assumed lobe risk neutral
here; mostofthe results go through if the employer is also risk averse, although the
required notationis slightiy more complicated.(See Burdenand ‘Wright 1989b.)
61f0 is chosenappropriately, then theefficientcontract impliesthe salonallocation
asthe competitive equilibriumallocation for the model. In other words,the use ofthe
labor conti-.sct language is merely a convenience, and the entire analysis can be
reinterpreted as a study of the effects of unemployment insumnee in any market
economy. One element ofmy medel that might seem important isthat thereare two
types ofagents, someendowed with laber(workers) and someendowed with capital
(employers). However, the main ressdts also hold in models where all agents are
identical; thereis no essential need to incorporatea distinction between workers and
employers (Wright and llotclikiss l9~).
13Absent unemployment insurance policy,this model implies
full employment. That is, ifg as 0, then an efficient contract
entails n(x) as 1 for all states x. The intuition is straightfor-
ward. Due to the assumption that workers am risk averse,
they always prefer work-sharing over layoffs. Since the
technological assumption I = nIt implies that the labor input
changes exactly as much whether n or It is reduced, the firm
is happy toaccommodate workers—at leastin the absence of
government intervention. Even with g > 0, the following is
true in this model: under either a North American or a
European unemployment insurancesystem, as long as e = I,
full employment results. Furthermore, as long as e = I, fully
efficient hours per worker also result.7 These results are
formally proven below.
PROPOSITION I. Under either the North American or the
European system,forany value of g, as long as experience-
rating is complete (e=1) an efficient labor contract will
involve n(x) = 1 andf~ = u
21u1 in evetystate x.
Proof The style of argument proceeds as follows: Assume
that an efficient labor contract does not have the asserted
properties, and derive a contradiction by constructing an
alternative contract that dominates it in the sense of yielding
greaterexpectedprofit at the same levelofexpectedutility, or
vice versa.
Consider the North American system, and assume that in
some state x0 the contract implies that n(x0) = ~ h(x0) =
w(x0) = w~, and b(x0) = b0, with n0 < 1. Then the expected
utility of a worker in state x0 is given by
(4) U0 = n5u(h0w0,l—h0) + (l—n0)ti(b0+g,1).
Now consider changing the contract (in this state oniy) to a
work-sharing contractwith n(x0) = 1, h(x0) = h*, and w(x0) =
w~, where h* =n0h0 and h*w*= n0h0w0 + (l—n0)(b0+g). This
simply says all workers get the same average hours and in-
come in the work-sharing contract as they got in the layoff
contract. Since u(.) is strictlyconcave,
(5) U* = l4(h*W*,l~h*)> U0
and workers strictly prefer the work-sharing contract.
When n(x0) = 1, h(x0) = h*, and w(x0) = w~, profit under
the work-sharing contract in state x0 is
(6) ~* =flh*,x0) — h*w* — T
=ftn0h0,.i~) — n0h0w0 — (l—n0)b0 — T — g(1—n0)
work-sharing contract, andthereforetheemployer is happyto
adopt the work-sharing contract
Since I have been able to construct a work-sharing con-
tract that dominates the layoffcontract, the lattercould notbe
efficient. Hence, under the stated assumptions, efficientcon-
tracts entail full employment in the North American system.
The argument for the European system is similar and is
actually aspecial caseof some results I will discuss later.The
statement concerning the efficiency of hours per worker will
follow directly from thefirst-orderconditions to problem (3),
which am discussed below. This completes the argument.
To reiterate, I have shown that the model with e =
implies full employment and efficient hours per worker.
Although the proof is fairly lengthy, the intuition is simple:
workers prefer work-sharing because they have concave
utility functions, andthe employer is happy toaccommodate
them, at least when experience-rating is complete (e=I). I
now discuss cases in which experience-rating is incomplete.
The North American System
The next result shows that the labor contract entails layoffs
for certain settings of e and g under the North American
system. In otherwords, there can be unemployment here that
is due exclusively to unemployment insurance.
PROPOsITION 2. Under the North American system, ~f e < 1,
then n(x) < 1 in any given state x ~fg is large enotigh.
Proof Choose some state x0, and suppose the contract
specifies that n(x0) as I, h(~) =It, andw(~) = w0. I now show
that it is possible to construct a contract with layoffs that
dominates this as long as g is sufficiently large.
Expectedutility in state x0 is U0 as u(h0w0,1—h0), and profit
for theemployer is ir.0=J(h0,x0) — h0w0 — T Suppose Ichange
employment and hours in this state to n* and h*, where It0 <
n* < 1 and It* ashgn*. As longas n* is nottoo much smaller
than one, no matter how risk averse workers am, there will
exist a compensating differential 6 such that if workers are
paid 6 overand above whatthey were eaming underthe full-
employment contract, then they will be justas well offunder
a contract with n(x0) as n* < 1. That is,
(7) U* = n*u(h0w0+6,1~h*) + (1~n*)u(h0w0~l~6,1)
- U0.
If I set w~ — (w5h0~l~6)IIt* and b* = w0h,3 + 6 — g, then
equation (7) says that workers am just willing to accept the
layoffcontract.
Hence, profit underthe layoffcontract equals profit underthe
Efficienthoursper workersimply meansthat the marginalproductoflaberequals
the workers’marginal rateofsubstisution:f1 u21u1.I now check profit. Under the layoffcontract,
(8) W~’ =ftn*It*v) — n*h*14,* — (l~n*)b*
— (l~n*)eg — T.
If I substitute the above values for ,n~, It*, and so on, then
after some simple algebra I find that
(9) ~* =; —6 + (l~n*)g(l~e).
If e < 1 and g is large enough, then in (9) the third term is
larger than the second term, which means that ~t’~ >
Hence, for e < 1 and g large, the full employment contract
could not have been efficient.
Summarizing, a layoff contract necessarily dominates a
work-sharing contract if (l—e)g is large.This can be seenin-
tuitively. UndertheNorth Americanunemployment insurance
system with e < 1, an employer can get the public sector to
subsidize its operations if and only if layoffs are part of the
contract. The subsidy g has to be large enough, however,
because workers need to be compensated by the amount
6 > 0i norder to accept the risk of layoffs in the contract.
Therefore,the subsidyhas tobe largeenough for firms topay
this compensation and still come out ahead.
To further study the properties of an efficient contract, I
investigate the marginal conditions for problem (3). The
Lagrangian is given by
(10) £=~j. {O~itQ) + X[U(x~) — U] + ~ —
where X is the multiplier on the constraint EU= U and t(x)
is the multiplieron the constraint n(x)=I. It is a straightfor-
ward matter to differentiate £ with respect to the choice
variables in each state x in onler to derive the first-order
conditions. These can be rearranged to yield several interest-
ing results. (See Burdett and Wright 1989b for details.)
One result is that an efficient contract always satisfies the
standard risk-sharing condition that the marginal utility of
consumption should be the same for employed and unem-
ployed workers and constant across states: Forall x,
(11) ut[ye~x), 1 — 11(x)] = u1Lv5~x),l]
= lA.
Anotherresult is that an efficient contractalways impliesthat
When ,i(x) < 1,
(13) f1(nh,.s~)It =Y~ —y11 — z + (l—e)g
where z an [u(y~,l—h) — u(y,~,l)]/X. With (l—e)g = 0, this is
the standard marginal condition for employment in models
with layoffs. With (l—e)g > 0, however, employment is dis-
torted.
This completes the analysis of the North American
unemployment insurance system. I have shown that this
system can encourage temporary layoffs if (1—e)g is suffi-
ciently high, even though themodel implies fullemployment
when (1 —e)g = 0. Of course, the model does not exclude
having layoffs in some states and full employment in others.
The marginal conditions indicate that when n(x) = 1, the
efficient hours conditionf1 = uJu~ will be satisfied.
0
The European System
Recall that undermy stylized European system, not only am
unemployment insurancebenefitspaid tolaid-offworkers, but
short-time compensation is also paid to short-time workers.
The next result shows that, under this system, an efficient
labor contract always specifies full employment. Thus, the
results above imply not only that unemployment insurance
can cause unemployment,but also that the lackof short-time
compensation is the essential factor.
PROPoSITION 3. Underthe Etovpeansystem, ,z(x) = I in every
statex,for any values ofthepolicyparameters.
Proof Suppose that in state x
0 the labor contract specifies
n(x0) = n0, h(x0) = It0, w(x0) = w0, and b(x0) = b0 with n0 < 1.
Expected utility of aworker in this state is given by
(14) U0 = fl0U[h014’0 + (l—h0)g, 1 — It0] + (l—n0)n[b0-l-g,l].
As in Proposition 1, consider changing the contract in this
state so that n(x0) = 1, h(x0) = It*, and w(x0) = w’~’, ~vhere 11*
— n0h0 and w~= +(l~n0)b0/It*. Since LI is strictlyconcave,
I again find that
(15) U* = ll(h*W*, l~It*) > U0
whichmeans workersprefer the work-sharingcontract. Again
as in Proposition 1, it is easy to checkthat profit is the same:
= it0. Hence, the layoff contract could not have been
efficient.
(12) f1(nhj) = u2/ut
which is the standard efficient hours condition when n = 1.
the North American system, the first-order conditions can also be used to
show that h’(x)= 0 and ~~‘(~) = 0 for all x ouch that n(.r) < I. That is, when some
workers are beitsg laid off, the hours and wages of the rest of the workers do not
change.This argument shows that workers who are risk averse
always prefer work-sharing to random layoffs. Under the
technological assumption that 1 = nIt, the employer is happy
to accommodate them. This would also be true under the
North American system, except for the fact that under the
North American system the worker-firm partnership can get
the public sector to subsidize its operations if and only if it
utilizes layoffs. The employer is able to pay workers the
compensating differential 6 and still come out ahead using
layoffs rather than work-sharing when the subsidy (l—e)g is
sufficiently large.Underthe Europeansystem, layoffsare not
necessary to take advantage of the subsidy because benefits
are paid toshort-time workers; therefore, an efficientcontract
under the European system necessarily yields full employ-
ment.
An unemployment insurance system with short-time
compensation cannot in and of itself cause unemployment;
but this does notmean that it does not affect the contract. As
was true under the North American system, the first-order
conditions here can be rearranged to yield several interesting
results. (See Burdett and Wright I989b for details.) In par-
ticular, the hours-per-workercondition is
Predicted Effectsof UnemploymentInsurance
On the Number 01 Workers (n) and Hours Per Worker (It)
5,0
(16) f1(h,x) Us/hr + (l—e)g.
For (l—e)g > 0, the marginal product of labor exceeds the
marginal rate of substitution, a situation referred to in the
literature as underemployment.
Therefore, although the use of short-time compensation
does not encourage layoffs as long as (l—e)g > 0, it still
distorts the labor input by affecting hours per worker. The
recommendation that follows from all of this is that policy-
makers’ attention would be betterdirectedtoward the tax,not
the benefit, side of unemployment insurance. Complete
experience-rating eliminates both the incentive for inefficient
temporary layoffs under the system without short-time
compensation and the incentive for inefficient hours per
worker under the system with short-time compensation.
Adding short-time compensation without increasing experi-
ence-rating from e < 1 to e = 1 merely substitutes underem-
ployment for unemployment.
A Comparison
The fundamental differencebetween the two unemployment
insurance systems is that, other things being equal, underthe
NorthAmerican systemthereis greaterrelianceon temporari-
ly laying off workers during economic downturns, while
underthe European system thereis greaterreliance on reduc-
ing hours per worker. The following proposition states this
formally, and the figure illustrates the results. (The technical
proofmerely involvesdifferentiating the first-orderconditions
and therefore is omitted; see Burdett and Wright 1989b for
details.)
PRor’oSITIoN 4. Under the North American system. n’(x) > 0
and h’~x~ = 0 in stateswitIt n(x) < I, while It’~x) > 0 ill states
with n(x) = 1. Under the European system, n(x) = 1 and
It’(x) > 0 inall states.
Ofcourse, theprediction ofzero layoffs under thestylized
European unemployment insurance system should not be
taken literally since in fact unemployment could occur for
several reasons. First, the assumption I = nIt is an extreme
stmplification, and some technologies imply layoffs even
without policy distortions.
9 Second, actual unemployment
insurance systems do nothave perfect short-time compensa-
tion and are typically a blend of the two stylized systems.
Third, the model in this paper is only meant to capture one
type of unemployment—temporary layoffs—and it neglects
other types, such as frictional unemployment. Nevertheless,
the fundamentalpredictionofthe model is this: In economies
that useshort-time compensation moreextensively,downturns
are more likely to be characterized by work-sharing rather
than layoffs; and ineconomiesthat use short-time compensa-
tion less extensively,downtums am more likely tobe charac-
Note that the indivisible labermodel usedin Hansen 1955.Rogerson iPee, and








16terized by layoffs for some workers and constant hours for
others.
Some Evidence
Someevidence in favorof this prediction has been provided
by Hamermesh (1978, pp. 246—47), who found that in the
United States, “when the demand for labor.., falls from a
cyclical peak, more widespread coverage of [unemployment
insurance] induces a ...greater reliance on layoffs, and a
lessened reduction in the workweek.” Additional evidence
comes from the work of Bemanke and Powell (1986). They
found that in the United States, postwar (and therefore post—
unemployment insurance)employers havereliedmore heavily
on layoffs than on reduced hours over the business cycle,
while in the prewar (and pre—unemployment insurance)
period, short workweeks were more common.
I now consider some cross-country evidence. Taking
natural logarithms and first-differencing the identity l = nIt
implies that L = N+ H, where L = Alog(l),N= Alog(n), and
H = Alog(It). Then, taking the variance of both sides of the
equation L = N+ H, I find that
(17) var(L) = var(N) + var(H) + 2cov(N,H).
This simple technique decomposes variability in the total
labor input into the pereentagedue to variance in thenumber
ofworkers and the percentage due to variance in the number
ofhours perworkerplus some covariance. (This procedure is
similar to that used by Hansen in 1985, although he filtered
hisdatausing theHodrick-Prescott techniqueratherthan first-
differencing.)
The table reports the results of this decomposition on
nonagricultural employment for the I 970s for the United
States andCanada, two countriesthat didnot have short-time
compensation during that period, and for ten European
countries that did. For the United States and Canada, only a
small percentage—about 8 percent and 5 percent—of the
variation inL is duetoH, while in the European countriesthe
percentage is much larger—never less than 27. The percent-
age due toNis considerably greater in the United States and
Canada than in most of the European countries, with the
exception ofDenmark and Italy. However, even in Denmark
and Italy, the variance inhours II is still substantially greater
than in the North American countries.
Conclusion
This paper has explored some implications of alternative
unemployment insurancesystems in a simple labor-contract-
ingframework. The main finding is that the North American
practice ofpaying benefits only to individuals working zero
hours can encourage the overuse of temporary layoffs—at
least if benefits am less than completely experience-rated
—while the European practice ofpaying short-time compen-
sation to workers on reduced hours does not. However, the
European system can create a distortion in hours per worker,
and this leads to underemployment if not unemployment.
These predictions of the model have been shown to be
generally consistent with the cross-country evidence. The
policy implication is toalleviate distortionson the tax side of
both the North American and the European systems by a
more completeexperience-ratingofunemployment insurance
taxes. Adding short-time compensation without increasing
experience-rating merely substitutes underemployment for
unemployment.
Given that the model demonstrates rather clearly the
efficiency gains from complete experience-rating, why do
actual governments deviate so consistently from such a
policy? The answer must involve something not considered
in this paper. One thing I did not consider here is the
distributional aspect of unemployment insurance. To the
extent that different agents in the economy receive different
benefits from and pay different costs for unemployment
insurance, distributional factors obviously exist; hence,
political forces must be considered. For example, with less
than complete experience-rating, unemployment insurance
obviously subsidizes workers, firms, occupations, and geo-
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‘The slalislics ate based on nonagriculloral employment data during 1970—79.
Source: lnleroatinnal Labor Organizationgraphic regions ofa country that am subject to greater-than-
average fluctuations. Pursuing the implications of this idea
would take me too far afield here, but interested readers may
wish to refer tothe analyses ofBoadway and Oswald (1983)
or Wright (1986).to
The approachto unemployment insurance andunemploy-
ment taken here may also have broader implications for the
waywethinkabout labormarketsinmacroeconomics. Recent
work in the real business cycle paradigm, forexample, finds
that models with nonconvex labormarkets am important for
capturing certainaspects oftheaggregate time series (Hansen
1985 and Prescott 1986). Without some nonconvexity, under
standard assumptions, a representative agent equilibrium
model generatesfluctuations inhours butnotinemployment.
Alternative models, such as the one studied by Hansen
(1985), that simply assume labor time is indivisible are
making anextremeassumption andone that leads to fluctua-
tionsin the fraction ofemployedworkers butnotinhours per
worker.
As Heckman (1984, p. 212) puts it, the “numberssuggest
that any serious empirical model of business-cycle labor
marketfluctuations mustaccount for [laborinput] variationat
the extensive margin as well as atthe intensivemargin.” Cho
and Cooley (1988) and Kydland and Prescott (1991) have
developedmodels with fluctuations inbothmargins based on
technologicalconsiderations. Theresults here suggest that the
particular form of social insurancemay also help to explain
fluctuations along both margins. Pursuingthis avenue further
hasa potential advantage overassuming indivisibilities, fixed
costs, or other nonconvexities because the relevant policy
variablesmay be morereadily quantifiable across econorrues.
0The political-ecooomie models in those papers also explain why a public
unemployment insurancesystem may bepartofan equilibriumbasedon distributional
considerations in economieswhere there is no other reason for the govemment Instep
in. The approash here, which istouse a model with no explicit redistributionaleffects
or market fallures,is motivated by adesire tofocus on thebasic efficiency implications
of unemployment insurance in as simple a model as possible.
18The views expressed herein are those of the author and not necessarily those of the Federal
Reserve Bank of Minneapolis or the Federal Reserve System.